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Central banks have won in credibility as from the mid-eighties by keeping
inﬂation under control. However, conﬁdence in low inﬂation might have en-
couraged agents to excessive risk-taking, leading asset prices to rise. Moreover,
the belief in a Federal Reserve guarantee against a sharp market decline spread
across US markets as from the nineties. This belief, commonly referred to as
the Greenspan put, raised again the question about the role of asset prices in
monetary policy decisions.
The problem is addressed by modeling the reaction of the Fed to stock-
market deviations from fundamentals over the period stretching from August
1987 to October 2008, which corresponds to the periods where Greenspan until
January 2006 and Bernanke from thereon were chairmen. A Taylor rule de-
scribing the Fed’s nominal feedback rule to inﬂation and economic activity on
a monthly basis is extended to take account of asset prices. The indicators
considered are deﬂation and volatility in stock prices. Furthermore, a Markov
switching process allows to capture contemporaneous as well as forward-looking
monetary policy responses to asset prices over the period.
We ﬁnd out that taking asset price deﬂation improves the Taylor rule ﬁt
by some 8%. In periods when the Fed was actively pursuing an expansive or
restrictive monetary policy, its reaction to volatility or deﬂation of ﬁnancial
markets was signiﬁcant. We also see that the reaction of the Fed to asset prices
was greater during ﬁnancial crises, especially when modeling a forward-looking
decision process. Agents’ conﬁdence in a stronger response of the US central
bank to signiﬁcant market declines urging to an easing of monetary conditions
in their favour was therefore not unfounded.
JEL: C11, C22, E44, E52, E58.
Keywords: monetary policy, nominal feedback rule, asset prices, United
States.
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1 Introduction
The subprime credit crisis which hit the world economy in 2007 illustrated once more
the workings of integrated ﬁnancial markets and raised a few major questions about
the responsibilities of central banks. The expression Greenspan put had already es-
tablished itself in the US markets at the end of the nineties as the belief that the Fed
would intervene to guarantee a minimum level of asset prices. The consensus view
amongst central bank practitioners is that inﬂation should be targeted. Excessive
inﬂation in the prices of goods and services is harmful for economies. But just as
conventional inﬂation can distort the allocation of resources, asset price inﬂation
distorts economic behaviour by reducing savings and investments because of an in-
ﬂated value of underlying assets. Other important eﬀects of asset prices on the real
economy operate through the balance sheet channel for ﬁrms or households using
asset values when borrowing. Booms and busts in asset prices can therefore be as
much a threat to economic stability as conventional inﬂation.
Many argue that asset prices, however, are not to be targeted, because bubbles
are diﬃcult to recognise ex ante; and even if it were possible, the macroeconomic
consequences of bubbles and crashes are limited as long as central banks keep in-
ﬂation under control (Bernanke, Gertler, 2002). Inﬂation targeting would make it
unnecessary for central banks to try to inﬂuence asset prices. In the late nineties,
the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) used this framework to explain its decision path not
to prick the stock market bubble, but instead waited for it to burst and then cut
rates accordingly to cushion the economic consequences. As from 2003, the economic
outlook in the US was again in a similar setting. Moreover, a question remains open:
if at time of soaring asset prices monetary policy were to be tighter, would this stop
a bubble building up? A rise in interest rates would hardly stop agents borrowing
to buy an asset expected to appreciate, but would push inﬂation below target.
Other central banks, such as the Bank of England, the European Central Bank
(ECB) and the Reserve Banks of Australia and New Zealand, have supported the
view that monetary policy should sometimes act to restrain a rapid increase in credit
and asset prices. This was for example one of the main justiﬁcations for raising in-
terest rates in Britain in 2004, while the ECB pointed to the second pillar of its
monetary policy strategy, which monitors growth in money supply and credit. The
Bank of Japan declares its decision process to follow two directions: the ﬁrst per-
spective is the outlook for economic activity and prices, while the second considers
the risks relevant to the conduct of monetary policy. In its annual report published
less than one year after the beginning of the credit crunch, the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS, 2008) recalls the ﬁnancial instability hypothesis1 by Minsky. The
institution insists on the procyclicality of the ﬁnancial system and excessive growth
rate and thus on the importance of the whole system operation. It believes that the
expansion of money and credit has played a key role which is ignored in new Keyne-
1In the eighties, Hyman Minsky recognised that capital economies after a long period of prosper-
ity end up in a circle of ﬁnancial speculation. In brief, the ﬁnancial instability hypothesis states that
over a period of good times, the ﬁnancial structures of a dynamic capitalist economy endogenously
evolve from being robust to being fragile. The Minsky moment is the point when the Ponzi game
collapses.3
sian economic theory where ﬁnancial markets have no economic consequences in the
long run. For this reason, it suggests that monetary policy framework take explicit
account of asset price developments and stresses on the need to tighten monetary
policy when credit growth soars and asset prices explode, even if this temporarily
could reduce inﬂation to lower levels than targeted. Substitution eﬀects could also
take place such that earnings on interest-bearing bonds increase.
Additionally to these divergences in views and behaviours, central banks also suﬀer
from a credibility paradox. Their success in controlling inﬂation as from the mid-
eighties have won them credibility; at the same time, conﬁdence in a low inﬂation
might have encouraged agents to excessive risk-taking which led prices in assets such
as housing and securities to rise. Financial markets have gained in openness and
integration in such a way that crises can spread across markets and continents with
unexpected speed. The credit crisis might have unveiled the drawbacks of a hands-
oﬀ view. If the banking system were insulated from the asset markets, the view
that monetary policies should not be inﬂuenced by what happens in asset markets
would make sense. Asset bubbles and crashes would aﬀect only the non-banking
sector; however, the movements in the asset markets did aﬀect the banking sector.
Banks were heavily implicated both in the development of the bubble in the housing
markets and its subsequent crash. The central banks were also heavily involved ow-
ing to the fact that they provide liquidity to the banks during the crisis. In recent
years, a signiﬁcant part of liquidity and credit creation has also occurred outside the
banking system. Hedge funds and special conduits have been borrowing short and
lending long, and as a result have created credit and liquidity on a massive scale. As
long as this liquidity creation was not aﬀecting banks, it was not a source of concern
for the central bank. However, banks were implicated and thus, the central bank
was implicitly extending its liquidity insurance to institutions outside the regulatory
framework.
Monetary policy changes have implications for ﬁnancial markets. In this paper,
we will not try to disentangle causality between monetary policy and asset prices,
but will constrain the analysis to the reaction of monetary policy to asset markets
in the United States over the past two decades. Has the attitude of the Fed towards
asset prices undergone changes during speciﬁc phases? Have asset prices at some
point inﬂuenced the choice of the central bank’s instrument and thus been leading
monetary policy decisions? Is there any evidence that the Fed behaved diﬀerently
at historic moments, e.g. during the emerging market ﬁnancial crises of 1997 and
1998, during the bubble in technology stocks that burst in 2000 or during the credit
crunch that started in 2007? Extending a Taylor rule to asset prices as well as
taking state-dependent reactions into account could provide some answers to these
questions.
2 Asset prices and monetary policy in the US
In the wake of ﬁnancial liberalisation, asset prices have gained importance in driving
economic ﬂuctuations, allocating resources across sectors and time. Moreover, asset
prices take on several related roles within the monetary policy and ﬁnancial frame-
works: acting as information on market expectations and risk behaviour, as leading4
indicators of output, inﬂation and ﬁnancial distress and as indicators of the shocks
that hit the economy. In recent years, policymakers have been confronted with
sometimes unusual developments in asset prices, including strong booms and busts,
exceptional strength and breadth in the upswing of residential property prices, his-
torically low long-term interest rates, low volatility and very narrow credit spreads.
As a result, it has become more important to understand what determines asset
price movements, to interpret the message they contain about the future and to
reassess the place they take in policy decisions (H¨ ordahl and Packer, 2006).
A leading indicator is an economic indicator that changes before the economy has
changed. The Fed watches many of these indicators as it decides what to do about
interest rates. Share prices are one of them, since they signal changes in real activity.
Furthermore, there is empirical evidence for a negative relation between real share
prices and expected inﬂation which can be explained by inﬂation proxying for real
activity (Sellin, 1997). In countries that experienced broad swings in asset prices,
asset price inﬂation has tended to be correlated with stable or declining consumer
price inﬂation (Filardo, 2002). The author adds that consumer price inﬂation often
rises after asset prices collapse.
During the Greenspan era, monetary policy appeared to have followed the Tay-
lor rule to a surprising extent. Taylor (1999) argues that the higher responsiveness
of monetary policy to both inﬂation and output growth during the period 1987 –
1997 was crucial for the lower level and greater stability of inﬂation. In a retro-
spective on asset price inﬂation and central bank policy, Voth (2000) notices that a
failure to account for a positive output gap increases the danger of a bubble in asset
markets developing. He suggests that the late nineties, a period of strong growth,
low inﬂation and soaring asset prices, have been accompanied by a loose monetary
policy due to a weakening reaction of the Fed to output gap: in fact, trying to give
growth a chance would imply asymmetric policy responses to positive and negative
output gaps.
Monetary policy decisions are inﬂuenced by a worsening condition of ﬁnancial in-
stitutions. In the late nineties, the expression Greenspan put appeared in the press
and meanwhile, it is an established expression in the ﬁnancial vocabulary. It was
used to describe a Fed guarantee against a sharp market decline, as in 1998 the
investment ﬁrm Long-Term Capital Management collapsed. To ensure liquidity in
capital markets, the Fed lowered its interest rate. From thereon, investors could as-
sume that the Fed would be likely to lower its interest rates if there was a disruption
in the capital markets which would serve to bail out investors who had engaged in
behaviour they would not have had, had this guarantee not been in eﬀect.
The fear that higher interest rates could prove disastrous for weakened banks can re-
frain central banks from raising them. Empirical studies show that monetary easing
leads to higher equity prices (Sellin, 1997). Monetary policy also seems to exert an
inﬂuence on stock prices independently of the business cycles. Generally, asset prices
reﬂect perceptions of future income streams that assets will earn. But when asset
price movements are out of line with underlying economic fundamentals, the ques-
tion whether monetary policy contributed to this exuberance often arises. Schwartz5
(2002) even asks whether the Fed has had any responsibility for share prices either
during the upswing in the second half of the nineties or the downswing as from 2001.
Literature suggests that monetary policy might have been too accommodative up to
1998 facilitating an upswing, but as from 1999 the easing was withdrawn.
Another point of interest is the lagged interest rate which Clarida, Gal` ı and Gertler
(2000) introduced to complete the Taylor rule: this lagged dependent variable allows
for a gradual adjustment of interest rates to inﬂation and output gap. Rudebusch
(2002) suggests that interest-rate smoothing could arise if an autocorrelated vari-
able is incorrectly excluded from the estimated reaction function. Gerlach-Kristen
(2004) reports interestingly that the excluded variable could reﬂect ﬁnancial market
conditions, or variables correlated with risk spreads in ﬁnancial markets and thus
capturing market stress.
In the ﬁrst part of the analysis, we introduce the nominal feedback rule to the
contemporaneous variables, inﬂation and output gap. The rule is then extended to
two variables related to asset prices, and state-dependent reactions to the explana-
tory variables are explored. In the second part, we proceed with the same analysis,
but this time with a forward-looking nominal feedback rule. To estimate the Taylor
rule, we use the OLS methodology, and in the presence of endogenous explanatory
variables GMM. For the MLE Markov-switching regression, we introduce the Hamil-
ton ﬁlter in the absence and presence of endogenous explanatory variables, following
Kim (2003).
Our main ﬁnding is that the Federal Reserve responded either to deﬂation or to
volatility in asset prices signiﬁcantly, thus reacting to asset prices over the whole
period. Furthermore, the reaction of the Fed to future asset price development was
greater during ﬁnancial crises. These results suggest that if ﬁnancial markets take
the historical Taylor rule as given, then they could be conﬁdent that excessive asset
price deﬂation would have a greater impact in the interest-rate setting and therefore
that the Fed would be acting in their favour with an easing of monetary conditions.
3 Contemporaneous analysis with changes in regime
3.1 Data
We use monthly data to analyse the interest-rate setting in the United States. The
interest rate it is a monthly average of the Federal Funds rate. Following Clarida,
Gal` ı and Gertler (1998), we use the consumer price index to measure inﬂation and
an index of industrial production to measure output. The inﬂation πt is the year-
on-year change of the consumer price index. The output gap is computed as the
percentage deviation of the industrial production index from its HP-ﬁltered trend2.
Capacity utilisation series display a similar pattern to the computed output gap.
2The parameter λ controlling the smoothness of the series ﬁltered with the Hodrick-Prescott
method is set to 129
 600. It corresponds to a power value of 4 recommended by the frequency
power rule of Ravn and Uhlig (2002): the number of periods per year divided by 4, raised to a
power, and multiplied by 1600.6
We consider stock prices in order to have some monthly data of asset prices. Mon-
etary policy has implications for stock markets. In order to avoid the endogene-
ity problems and biased OLS estimates caused by these interactions, we introduce
lagged values for ﬁnancial markets. The variable αt−1 is deﬁned as the gap in in-
ﬂation between asset prices and their fundamental values. Asset price inﬂation is
the year-on-year change of a monthly average of the share price index (daily index,
Standard & Poor’s 500), while inﬂation in asset fundamental values is deﬁned as the
year-on-year change of a monthly average of dividend yields3. To prove the presence
of a put protection on sharp market declines, we introduce the variable α−
t−1 as the




|αt−1| if αt−1 < 0
0 otherwise
We will refer to this variable as asset price deﬂation, that is when asset prices grow
less than their fundamental values. More generally, testing the Fed’s response to
αt−1 reveals high signiﬁcance. Furthermore, there is an asymmetric reaction of the
Fed to positive and negative gaps in inﬂation between asset prices and their fun-
damental values: regressions including both, positive gaps α+
t−1 as well as negative
gaps α−
t−1, display only signiﬁcance of the former variable leaving the latter out.
These results go beyond the scope of the paper which focuses only on negative de-
velopments in asset markets and therefore are not reported here.
The second moment of asset prices will be expressed by the volatility calculated
as the standard deviation of stock returns within a month4. The volatility5 reﬂects
the nature of asset prices driven primarily by revisions in expectations of future
returns, and thus expectations of future activity, inﬂation and monetary policy. In
order to reduce the impact of very high values in volatility6, we take the natural
logarithm. Here again, by assuming an arbitrary minimal volatility of 1 which loga-
rithm is deducted from the logarithm of volatility, we introduce the gap in volatility
ψα,t−1. Note also that we introduced above the absolute value of the negative gap
in asset price inﬂation in order to describe the reaction of the Fed to either deﬂation
or to volatility in asset prices as negative.
HERE Figure 1
3Dividends are a primary measure of fundamentals. The dividend yield of the S&P 500 is being
used as an indicator of the overall value of the market. At market peaks, the average dividend yield
sinks below 2%, whereas during extreme lows it can take on double ﬁgures. Negative growth in
dividend yields give lead to an overpricing of shares, while positive growth in dividend yields can
be considered as evidence that stocks are underpriced. (Campbell and Shiller, 2001)
4Stock returns are calculated as the growth in the share price index. The intra-month standard
deviation is normalised with the number of labour days in a year, i.e.
√
260.
5We could also have considered the implicit volatility index (VIX), which shows the market’s
expectation of 30-day volatility. It is constructed using the implied volatilities of a wide range of
S&P 500 index options. This volatility is meant to be forward looking and is calculated from both
calls and puts. The VIX is a widely used measure of market risk and is often referred to as the
investor fear gauge; the index tracking the S&P 500 and therefore allowing for a more accurate view
of investors’ expectations on future market volatility, is only available as from 2003. We therefore
had to content ourselves with this calculation of volatility.
6In October 1987, volatility reached a peak value of 92.7
The evolution of these ﬁve variables it, πt, yt, α−
t−1 and ψα,t−1 are displayed in
Figure 1 for the period stretching from August 1987 to October 2008. Asset price
deﬂation is deﬁned in a way to capture ﬁnancial market crises, in particular the
1987 stock market crash, the burst of the dotcom and the recent subprime mortgage
bubble. Asset price volatility tends to increase in periods of uncertainty, but is not
clearly related to bubble built-up and burst periods. When the dotcom bubble burst,
volatility had increased, but was still relatively low, while it reached impressive high
values in the last months of 1987 and 2008.
3.2 Extension of the Taylor rule
As starting point for the analysis, we consider a Taylor rule. The basis equation for
the Fed’s target instrument is:
i∗




t =( πt,y t) and β  =( βπ,β y). (2)
We then specify persistency for the actual Funds rate it with the following relation-
ship:
it = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)i∗
t + εt (3)
where the implicit rate i∗
t follows the rule deﬁned by the Taylor rule (1), 0 <ρ<1
is the persistency factor and εt ∼ N(0,σ2
ε) i.i.d.. We then obtain the equation:
it = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)x 
tβ + εt (4)
which takes some interest-rate smoothing into account.
Equation (1) with target variables and parameters as deﬁned in (2) can be derived
as the optimal reaction function of a central bank targeting inﬂation and output
gap, where βπ and βy are functions of policymakers’ preferences and the parameters
of the IS and Phillips curves. The constant which we do not report here reﬂects
the equilibrium real interest rate and the targeted value of inﬂation. A necessary
condition for the response of the real rate target to changes in inﬂation and in the
output gap to be stablilising is that βπ be greater than one and βy greater than zero.
We now introduce the lagged gap in asset price deﬂation α−
t−1 and in asset price
volatility ψα,t−1 as explanatory variables. (1) remains the same with:
x 
t =( πt,y t,α −
t−1,ψ α,t−1) and β  =( βπ,β y,β α−,β ψα)( 5 )
We set βψα = 0 and βα− = 0 by turns. We expect the reactions of the Fed to
absolute values of asset price deﬂation or to volatility to be negative. Equation (1)
with variables deﬁned as in (5) could be derived as the optimal reaction function
of monetary policymakers, were they to target asset price deﬂation or volatility in
addition to inﬂation and output gap. Since α−
t−1 and ψα,t−1 are expressed as gaps,
the constant further reﬂects the equilibrium real interest rate and the targeted value8
of inﬂation, but is also aﬀected by the real minimum volatility which we had arbi-
trarily assumed to be one.
The performance of a Taylor rule depends sensitively on the reliability of real-time
data and on the availability of forecasts (Orphanides, 2007). While data on inﬂation
and stock prices are rarely subject to revisions, this is hardly the case when it comes
to information regarding the current state of the economy. However, by taking an
index on industrial production not only do we have access to a monthly estimate of
the output gap, but we also have a proxy of real-time output gap: the industrial pro-
duction index is only subject to slight revisions during the three or four months after
its ﬁrst release. Thus, we allow ourselves to leave the problem of real-time data aside
and to concentrate on monetary policy with forward-looking data in the next section.
The results of the regressions are reported in Tables 1 and 2 for the Greenspan
period, i.e. from July 1987 until January 2006, and from July 1987 until October




The OLS estimates for the interest-rate setting with persistency, described in equa-
tion (4) and reported in Table 1, provide a good ﬁt with high values for R
2,b u t
this is mainly due to the weight of the lagged variable and thus the impact of the
inﬂation variable in particular looses its signiﬁcance. This could be explained by the
fact that inﬂation and the lagged interest rate are highly correlated and strongly
collinear, especially since we have monthly data. The qqplots indicate departure
from the assumption of normal distribution for residuals. Furthermore, we consider
the fact that the signiﬁcance of lagged interest rate could be due to an omitted vari-
able with an autoregressive pattern as shown by Rudebusch (2002). Gerlach-Kristen
(2004) suggested ﬁnancial stress. Asset price deﬂation and volatility also display a
high autoregressive pattern.
For these reasons, we renounce to persistency in interest-rate setting and thus re-
strain our analysis to a Taylor rule with no smoothing term, as deﬁned in equation
(4) with ρ =0 7:
it = x 
tβ + εt (6)
Since the error distribution is not independent of the regressors’ distribution,
Et[x 
t˜ εt]  =0
we will need to introduce a k×1-vector zt of instrumental variables such that zt and
xt are correlated and that the orthogonality conditions Et[z 
t˜ εt] = 0 are satisﬁed. If
7We also control for the signiﬁcance of higher lags of asset price inﬂation and volatility; these
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, but the non-inertial rule has serially correlated shocks. The
presence of serial correlation in the residuals could also be due to the autocorrelation of inﬂation,
output gap or some other omitted variables.9
the errors are homoskedastic, we can obtain a closed form by using the two-stage least
squares. If the errors are diagnosed to be heteroskedastic, we will need to work with
the generalised method of moments (GMM). Heteroskedasticity is tested on OLS
residuals with the Breusch-Pagan test.8 In the context of GMM, the orthogonality
conditions:
m(β)=Et[z 
t(it − x 
tβ) ]=0
provide the basis for the estimation of the parameter vector β.9
Good instruments should be relevant and valid: they should be correlated with
the endogenous regressors and at the same time orthogonal to the disturbance. As
in previous studies, the instrument set includes lags of the short-term interest rate,
inﬂation, output gap, M2 growth as well as the spread between the long-term bond
rate and the short-term interest rate.
HERE Table 2
The estimations of the conventional Taylor rule with no interest-rate smoothing
as described by equation (6) display good results with signiﬁcant inﬂation and
output gap. The p-value for the J-statistic (Hansen, 1982) relates to the test of
over-identifying restrictions. A rejection of the null hypothesis would imply that the
instruments are not satisfying the orthogonality conditions required for their employ-
ment; the results conﬁrm that the null hypothesis is not rejected. The parameters
βπ and βy are relatively near to the values suggested by Taylor to ﬁt US data well
(βπ =1 .5a n dβy =0 .5), but only for the period from 1987 to 2006, corresponding
to the Greenspan period. This conﬁrms the statement that the Taylor rule provides
a reasonable description of the past twenty years and that the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007
8The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test provides a method to test whether errors are
homoskedastic. Homoskedastic errors have constant variance: Et[˜ εt˜ ε
 
t]=σ
2IT. In the case of
heteroskedasticity, σ
2
t is not constant. Assuming that σ
2




 zt), the null hypothesis refers to the case where a


















− 1 and zt is the (1 × k)-vector of instrument variables.
9There must be at least as many moment conditions as there are parameters to estimate in order
to achieve identiﬁcation: in other words, there must be at least as many instrument variables as
there are elements in β. In the case where there are more instrument variables than parameters, the
system is overidentiﬁed and not all the moment restrictions will be satisﬁed. A weighting matrix





An important contribution of Hansen (1982) is to point out that setting W = S
−1, the inverse of an
asymptotic covariance matrix, is optimal in the sense that it yields ˆ β with the smallest asymptotic










seems to trigger another kind of monetary policy.10
The parameter for asset price deﬂation is statistically signiﬁcant. Considering the
values that α−
t−1 can reach, in average 7 percentage points ranging mostly from 0 to
60 over the period stretching from August 1987 to October 2008, its contribution
to the interest rate can amount to −1.98 pp in extreme cases; in other words, the
g a pi na s s e tp r i c ed e ﬂ a t i o nc o u l de x p l a i nu pt oa2p pd e v i a t i o no ft h ei n t e r e s tr a t e
from the path outlined only by inﬂation and output gap. As can be observed in
Figure 3, the introduction of a gap in asset price deﬂation as explanatory variable
improves the ﬁt especially for the periods between 2002 and 2004, as well as 2008,
where α−
t−1 reached -60. The easing of monetary policy between 2002 and 2004 is not
well explained by only inﬂation and output gap; asset price deﬂation explains some
0.15 deviation of the interest rate in average. The introduction of the explanatory
variable α−
t−1 even improves the R
2 values; the ratio of explained variation to total
variation is improved by some 8% over the whole period.
HERE Figure 3
The regression results do not improve when introducing the volatility to equation
(6), because the negative impact, βψα, is partially insigniﬁcant. Asset price deﬂa-
tion and volatility although stemming from the same data generating process display
quite low correlations (0.45). The fact that volatility is not clearly related to periods
of ﬁnancial crises could explain this insigniﬁcance. If the Fed were to react to an
increase in uncertainty in ﬁnancial markets, one would indeed expect volatility to
have a negative eﬀect on interest rate, i.e. high volatility inducing a more expansive
monetary policy.
The consistency of these ﬁrst estimations can be tested by computing the Fed’s
long-term inﬂation target on the grounds of the economy’s long-term average real
interest rate. This rate can be taken from the yield on 10-year Treasury inﬂation-
protected securities (TIPS) which measures what the market expects real interest
rates to average over the next ten years.11 For most regressions in Table 2 we derive
a target inﬂation π∗ between 2.7 and 3.7; although the values derived for target
inﬂation are higher than 2, they do conﬁrm that the regressions are plausible.
10Kevin Warsh, member of the Federal Reserve Board, declared to the International Herald
Tribune: ”While the Taylor rule provided a reasonable description of the past twenty years, it failed
to account for the crisis that unfolded in 2007-2008”. The regressions were also performed over the
period going from January 1966 to October 2008. Over this period, all parameters are signiﬁcant
except for volatility; βπ is slightly lower than 1 and βy is around 0.2.
11 The equilibrium real interest rate r
∗ and the inﬂation π




∗ + βπ(πt − π
∗)+βyyt
The term r
∗ +( 1− βπ)π
∗ corresponds to the constant which is not reported in the regressions of
(6). We will refer to this constant as βc. While Taylor (1993) suggested r
∗ =2 ,π
∗ =2 ,βπ =1 .5
and βy =0 .5, we compute π
∗ =
βc−r∗
1−βπ . The TIPS give a long term real rate r
∗ of 1.8 over the
period starting in January 1999 and going until October 2008, such that π
∗ take values around 3.11
3.3 First-order Markov switching model with two states
Has the US central bank pursued diﬀerent monetary policy targets in the last twenty
years? We address this question by deﬁning a model that allows the interest rate to
follow a diﬀerent time series process over diﬀerent time periods. We will model the
regime St as the outcome of an unobserved two-state Markov chain. We investigate
two diﬀerent switching models. In the ﬁrst one, the model assumes the Fed to adapt
its overall behaviour to the state of the economy: all target variables considered
are state dependent. In the second one, the Fed is assumed to maintain a constant
reaction over time to its main targets, inﬂation and output gap; it adjusts its reaction
to ﬁnancial markets accordingly to the situation: only asset price deﬂation and
volatility are state dependent. Looking at both these models should also allow us to
check the results’ robustness.
3.3.1 State-dependent target variables
The state variable xt =( πt,y t,α t−1,ψ αt−1) follows a Markov switching process con-
strained to two states. Formally, the interest-rate setting can be written as:
it = x 
tβSt + εt (7)
where εt ∼ N(0,σ2
ε,St) i.i.d. and with St independent of εt  for all t and t .T h e
reaction parameters and their variances are:




Let Ωt =( it,i t−1,...,i0;x 
t,...,x 
0) be a vector containing all observations obtained
through date t. The exogenous variables consist of a constant term which is not
included in the equation (7) and of the target variables x 
t. Since there is substantial
variation in the equilibrium real rate (Laubach and Williams, 2001), the constant
term would most probably follow another process than the one implied by the target
variables. For the sake of simplicity, we assume the constant term to be constant
over time and take it as state-independent. The unknown parameters are the state-
independent parameter for the constant term which we do not report here and the
state-dependent parameters βSt with βSt,α− = 0 and βSt,ψα =0b yt u r n s ,a sw e l la s
the transition probabilities pij = Pr{St = j|St−1 = i}. The transition probabilities






where p00 + p01 = 1 and p01 + p11 =1 .
We set initial values for the probability that at time t = 0 one of the regime rules
given the information set Ω0 :P r {S0|Ω0} =0 .5. On this account, we can maximise
the log likelihood with respect to the parameters β0,β 1,σ2
ε,0,σ2
ε,1 and to the transition
probabilities P, by reconstructing the whole process of probabilities, Pr{St|Ωt}T
t=1.12











Pr{St = j|Ωt}f(it|St = j,Ωt)}12
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Taking into account the fact that the Taylor rule ﬁts US data best for the last
twenty years, we construct the process on the period going from August 1987 up to
October 2008. Fitting the data according to the model deﬁned under (7) with the
state variable x 
t and βψα constrained to 0, the estimated parameters reported in Ta-
ble 3 show evidence that there are two clear regimes. The states are displayed over
the time period in the ﬁgures reported with the table. The state S0 is often charac-
terised by a reaction to inﬂation below 1 and to output gap higher than 0.5, while
in state S1 the answers to inﬂation and output gap are close to the Taylor values
(β1,π =1 .071 and β1,y =0 .220). The answer to asset price deﬂation is in both states
signiﬁcant. The process where βα− is constrained to zero displays also a negative
reaction to asset volatility in both regimes β0,ψα = −0.284 and β1,ψα = −0.902. The
results obtained reﬂect the fact that the Fed either responds to asset price deﬂation
or to volatility, implying that it always reacts to asset prices in a way or the other.
Note also that excluding ﬁnancial variables, in other words constraining the target
variables only to inﬂation and output gap, does not reveal the presence of two states.




1 for an ordinary monetary policy
0 for a destabilising monetary policy
(9)
with xt as deﬁned in (5).
In summary, the regime St = 1 stands for the regime where the Fed follows an
ordinary monetary policy with a signiﬁcant reaction to asset prices, whereas St =0
corresponds to the Fed pursuing a destabilising monetary policy. A destabilising
monetary policy is characterised by at least one of the following features: a destabil-
ising response to inﬂation β0,π < 1, an overactive response to output gap β0,y > 0.5
and negative reactions to asset price absolute deﬂation β0,α− < 0 or to volatility




ε,1 and P. The process Pr{St|Ωt}
T
t=1 which is needed to
calculate the log likelihood is reconstructed following two iterations:
We set Pr{S0|Ω0}.
For any given t ranging from 1 to T:
Step 1 Given Pr{St−1|Ωt−1}, we calculate:
Pr{St = j|Ωt−1} =
1 
i=0
pij Pr{St−1 = i|Ωt−1} for j =0 ,1.
Step 2 We then proceed to the updating of Pr{St|Ωt}:














i=0 Pr{St = i|Ωt−1}f(it|St = i,x 
t,Ωt−1)
.13
β0,ψα < 0. On the other hand, an ordinary monetary policy with a tendency to
react to asset prices has a stabilising behaviour towards inﬂation β1,π > 1, reacts
less to economic growth β1,y < 0.5, but would also react to asset prices: β1,α− < 0o r
β1,ψα < 0. Here again, the results suggest that the Fed reacted to asset prices over
the whole period. Descriptive statistics for each state13 show that the state St =1i s
characterised by high interest rate, a positive output gap and a relatively low asset
price deﬂation in average, while in state St = 0 the interest rate is low, the output
gap is negative and asset price deﬂation high.
3.3.2 State-independent and dependent target variables
In the previous section, all target variables were state dependent. Suppose now that
the reactions to inﬂation and output gap were time independent and that only the
reactions to asset prices were state dependent. Thus, the regimes are only concerned
with the behaviour towards asset price deﬂation and volatility. The interest-rate
setting is deﬁned according to:
it = X 
tA + x 
tβSt + εt (10)
where εt ∼ N(0,σ2
ε,St) i.i.d.. The state-independent variables and parameters are:
X 
t =( πt,y t) and A  =( βπ,β y). (11)
The state-dependent variables are:
xt =( α−
t−1,ψ α,t−1) and βSt =( βSt,α−,β St,ψα).
As in the previous section, we deﬁne two diﬀerent processes to capture the reaction
of the Fed to negative developments in asset prices. For the ﬁrst process, we set
βSt,ψα = 0, while for the second one it is the reaction to asset price deﬂation which
is equal to 0, i.e. βSt,α− = 0. Both processes display two regimes which can be
characterised in the following way:
St =

1 with a smaller reaction to asset prices,
0 with a greater reaction to asset prices.
(12)
In other terms, for the ﬁrst process we have β0,α− <β 1,α− < 0, while for the second
process, we obtain: β0,ψα <β 1,ψα < 0.
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The processes found for the interest-rate settings (7) and (10) display similar regimes;
in fact, the Fed pursues a more expansive monetary policy during periods of ﬁnancial
crises, i.e. end of the eighties, beginning of the nineties, the aftermath of the dotcom
bubble and as from 2008.
In the next section, we will introduce a forward-looking Taylor rule and check
whether we can improve the coincidence between the states and the data char-
acteristics.
13State 0 was deﬁned with a probability Pr{St =0 |Ωt} smaller than 0.1, while state 1 with
a probability Pr{St =1 |Ωt} greater than 0.9. Conditional mean and standard deviation for the
interest rate and each target variables were computed in order to provide some characteristics
speciﬁc to each state.14
4 Analysis with leading indicators and changes in regime
4.1 Forward-looking Taylor rule
At this point of our analysis, we introduce a forward-looking rule: a more general
case than the Taylor rule introduced in (6). We deﬁne the forward-looking variables
xt,n such that each of its elements x
(j)




where n =( n(1),...,n(x)). For example, x 
t,n =( πt+6,y t+3,α −
t+1,ψ α,t+1) where the
forward vector n is deﬁned as n =( 6 ,3,1,1).
The interest-rate setting follows a forward-looking Taylor rule according to:
it = Etx 
t,nβ + εt (13)
= x 
t,nβ +˜ εt (14)
where εt ∼ N(0,σ2
ε) i.i.d. and ˜ εt = εt − (xt,n − Etxt,n) β. The variables xt,n and β
are deﬁned as in the previous chapter.
If a linear combination of present inﬂation and output gap is a suﬃcient statis-
tic for forecasting future inﬂation and output gaps, then equation (14) reduces to
the contemporaneous Taylor rule deﬁned in equation (6). As pointed out by Clar-
ida, Gal` ı and Gertler (1998), approximate forms of this rule are optimal for a central
bank that has a quadratic loss function. Moreover, forward-looking policy rules have
provided reasonably good descriptions of the way major central banks around the
world behave.
Including future values of asset prices might contradict the intuition of the eﬃ-
cient market hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, ﬁnancial markets process
available information rationally, so a stock price always equals the best estimate of
the value of the underlying business and changes in stock market are impossible to
predict from available information. However, the large movements in stock prices,
whether rational or not, have macroeconomic implications. Fluctuations in asset
prices often go hand in hand with ﬂuctuations in the economy more broadly. We
thus consider future values of asset prices as a sheer source of information for the Fed.
Here again, the error distribution is not independent of the regressors’ distribution,
Et[x 
t,n˜ εt]  =0
and we make use of the same instruments for the estimation method introduced for
(6).
We provide results for:
xt,n =( πt+1,y t+1,α −
t+3,ψ α,t+1)
and
xt,n =( πt+3,y t+3,α −
t+3,ψ α,t+1)15
in Table 5. Central banks base their interest rate decisions on expected inﬂation
rather than current inﬂation. πt+6 or even πt+12 should be included rather than
πt+1 since it takes at least six months before the eﬀects of change in monetary pol-
icy can be noticed in practice. The correlation between the lags of the instrumental
variables and inﬂation fade drastically after the ﬁrst three months, and the results
loose thereon in their signiﬁcance. We therefore had to constrain the analysis to
only πt+1 and πt+3.
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Although the ﬁt is not as good as in the contemporaneous regression, the p-value
for the J-statistic still conﬁrms that the instruments satisfy the orthogonality con-
ditions required for their employment. The parameters βπ, βy, βα and βψα obtained
are mostly signiﬁcant and quite similar to the ones found with contemporaneous
variables. Here, the estimate βπ is greater than 1 for the period including Bernanke
as chairman.
4.2 First-order Markov switching model with two states
4.2.1 State-dependent target variables
Our speciﬁcations belong to a class of Markov-switching regression models in which
regressors are correlated with the disturbance term:
it = x 
t,nβSt +˜ εt (15)
xt,n =( Ik ⊗ z 
t)γSt + vt (16)
where ˜ εt ∼ N(0,σ2
˜ εt,St) i.i.d. and vt ∼ N(0,Σv,St) i.i.d.
We will assume that the parameters in (16) are time-invariant to simplify the esti-
mation procedure: γst = γ and Σv,St =Σ v. The instrumental variables are valid if




t˜ εt]=Cv˜ ε = C0,v˜ ε(1 − St)+C1,v˜ εSt.
The state-dependent variables are:
βSt = β0(1 − St)+β1St and σ2
˜ ε,St = σ2
˜ ε,0(1 − St)+σ2
˜ ε,1St.
The maximum likelihood estimation of a Markov-switching regression model based
on the Hamilton ﬁlter, as we used in the previous section, is not valid in the pres-
ence of endogenous explanatory variables. However, Kim (2003) shows that there
exists an appropriate transformation of the model that allows to directly employ the
Hamilton ﬁlter. The transformed model is:
it = x 
t,nβSt +( xt,n − (Ik ⊗ z 
tγ)) δ1,St + δ2,Stω2,t (17)
where ω2,t ∼ N(0,1) i.i.d.. The explanatory variables and the disturbance term ω2,t
are no longer correlated by construction.14 The expression:





  as a function of two independent shocks ω1,t and ω2,t, we can use the
transformed model with a vector of bias correction terms as additional regressors to proceed with16
works as a correction bias term. The state-dependent parameters in front of the
correction bias term are:
δi,St = δi,0(1 − St)+δi,1St
for i =1 ,2.
We now refer to the information set which contains the endogenous variables it
and the instruments known at date t, as well as the forward-looking variables xt,n:







The estimation process occurs in two steps. First, we estimate (16) with OLS and
get ˆ γ. Given Pr{S0|Ω0,n} and ˆ γ, we here again maximise the quasi log likelihood
with respect to the parameters β0, β1, σ2
˜ ε,0, σ2
˜ ε,1, δ1,0, δ1,1, δ2,0, δ2,1 and P, by recon-
structing the whole process Pr{St|Ωt,n}T−n
t=1 .15
The two processes found for xt,n =( πt+1,y t+1,α −
t+3,ψ α,t+1)a n dxt,n =( πt+3,y t+3,α −
t+3,ψ α,t+1)
are deﬁned as in (9).
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This setting captures the same two regimes for the Fed’s behaviour, as described
in the contemporaneous analysis. In the ﬁrst one, the reaction to inﬂation is not
stabilising, while in the other regime monetary policy has a reaction factor above 1.
It is during the stabilising regime that the reaction to asset price inﬂation was more
a quasi maximum likelihood estimation procedure. Considering the Cholesky decomposition of the
covariance matrix of (v
 
t, ˜ εt)




















∼ N(0,I x+1) i.i.d.
The term b11 is equal to Σ
1/2
v . Ix+1 is the identity matrix with dimensions equal to the number of
variables in xt,n plus one. By substituting the above relations in (15), we obtain:
it = x
 
t,nβSt +( xt,n − (Ik ⊗ z
 
tγ))
 δ1,St + δ2,Stω2,t
where δ1,St = b21,StΣ
−1/2
v and δ2,St = b22,St.



































˜ ε,1, δ1,0, δ1,1, δ2,0, δ2,1 and P. The process
Pr{St|Ωt,n}
T−n










t,Ωt−1,n) simpliﬁes in the numerator and denomina-
tor.17
substantial, while volatility in asset price seems to be taken into account in periods
where not so much weight is given to inﬂation. In other words, the weight in the
targeting is shifted away from inﬂation.
4.2.2 State-independent and dependent target variables
As in the contemporaneous analysis with Markov switching regimes, we also in-
troduce the case where the eﬀect of πt and yt on the interest-rate setting is time
independent and the regimes are only concerned with the behaviour towards asset
price inﬂation and volatility.
it = X 
t,nA + x 








=( Ik ⊗ z 
t)γ + vt. (19)
As in (17), we obtain a transformed model with a correction bias term due to the
forward-looking terms:
it = Xt,nA + x 
t,nβSt +( Ξ t,n − (Ik ⊗ z 
tγ)) δ1,St + δ2,Stω2,t. (20)
The two processes are deﬁned as in (12).
HERE Table 7
The state-independent reactions to one-month and one-quarter ahead values of in-
ﬂation and output gap are in most settings stabilising, that is βπ is greater than
one and βy is positive. Here again, asset price deﬂation gap has a negative eﬀect on
interest rates: a strictly positive α−
t−1 will urge to an easing of monetary policy con-
ditions. The volatility gap in asset prices has a negative impact on the interest-rate
setting, and this again mostly in the periods where asset prices were on the descent:
the ﬁrst half of the nineties and in the aftermath of the dotcom bubble.
Let us conclude by concentrating on three main events of the last two decades and
observe how the Fed reacted on the grounds of these results. The ﬁrst episode is the
stock market crash which occurred in October 1987, referred to as the Black Mon-
day. Second, we will observe the dot-com economic boom at the end of the nineties.
Finally, we will spend a few words on the economic downturn which followed at the
beginning of the century. These examples should illustrate the asymmetric reaction
of the US central bank to asset prices: tightenings of monetary policy happen less
frequently and in a smaller extent in case of ﬁnancial exuberance than a loosening
of the monetary policy stance in case of ﬁnancial distress.
The late eighties were characterised by increasing inﬂation, gloomy economic prospects,
undervalued stock prices and high volatility in ﬁnancial markets. The Markov
switching process (12) with target variables (2) is at that moment in state 1; it
captures a slight negative reaction to asset price deﬂation (−0.020 and −0.026),
as well as a signiﬁcant negative reaction to volatility (−0.494 and −0.172). In the
twelve months following October 1987, the average gap in asset price deﬂation was
−25 and the average volatility was 3. The reaction of the Fed implied a loosening18
by some 0.5t o1 .5 percentage points from what is considered an ordinary monetary
policy. Some ten years later, the US economic situation was much diﬀerent: inﬂation
was low, economic growth was positive, asset prices were soaring and volatility in
stock prices was high. The gap in asset price inﬂation amounted to 43 in the years
1997–1998. A few quarters later, the dot-com bubble burst; inﬂation was still low,
the output gap reached negative values, ﬁnancial markets were on the descent and
volatility was high: in the year 2002 it reached 3.1. At the beginning of the century,
the process switched to the state 0; the reactions to volatility varied around −1.535
and −1.145, while the reactions to asset price deﬂation moved around −0.097 and
−0.077. The Fed reacted to the situation by lowering rates by some 3.5 percentage
points from what an ordinary Taylor rule would have given.
5 Conclusion
This study looked into the reaction of the Fed to asset prices over the past decades
and whether its attitude had undergone changes during speciﬁc phases. The Taylor
rule was extended with variables considering misalignments in stock prices, as well
as ﬁnancial uncertainty with volatility.
Whether we assume that monetary policy decision makers have reacted to inﬂa-
tion and output gap in a constant way over time or not, there is evidence that the
Fed has taken either asset price deﬂation or volatility into account. Over the past
twenty years, the Fed has reacted to forecasts of inﬂation in a stabilising manner: the
forward-looking Taylor rule with state-independent reactions to one quarter-ahead
inﬂation and output gap is well deﬁned in that sense. But, the role that asset prices
played in monetary policy and ﬁnancial stability frameworks is also signiﬁcant. The
US central bank might have had asset prices in mind when setting interest rates be-
yond its responsibility as a lender of last resort. There have been periods stretching
beyond the moments of acute ﬁnancial distress where the Fed has reacted to share
prices over the reaction implied by the pursuit of output and inﬂation stabilisation.
Our results do not exhibit a too lenient behaviour of the US central bank in the late
nineties, contrarily to what has been reported in the literature. However, there is
reason to think that an expansive monetary policy took place during the dot-com
crisis. Furthermore, everything seems to indicate that as from February 2008, the
Fed entered a regime where monetary policy conditions are loosened in accordance
with the the ﬁnancial markets.
Agents’ conﬁdence in a stronger response of the US central bank to signiﬁcant mar-
ket declines urging to an easing of monetary conditions in their favour was therefore
not unfounded over the last twenty years.19
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7 Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Federal Funds rate with potential targeting variables. On the left-hand
scale, the short-term interest rate it. On the right-hand scale, inﬂation πt, output
gap yt, the negative gap in asset price deﬂation −α−
t−1 and in volatility −ψα,t−1.22
period 1987.08–2006.01 1987.08–2008.10
nobs 222 255
ρ 0.963*** 0.957*** 0.965*** 0.984*** 0.975*** 0.979***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.070)
βπ 0.749* 0.751** 0.513 -0.561 0.053 -0.215
(0.433) (0.369) (0.431) (0.918) (0.564) (0.627)
βy 1.011*** 0.891*** 1.192*** 1.883*** 1.193*** 1.708***






2 0.993 0.994 0.994 0.991 0.992 0.993
logL 61 70 78 47 55 71
Table 1: Taylor rule with interest-rate smoothing, deﬁned as in equation (4): it =
ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)x 
tβ + εt with target variables x 
t =( πt,y t,α −
t−1,ψ α,t−1). */**/***
denotes signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1 percent level; the standard errors are reported in




βπ 1.254*** 1.197*** 1.283*** 0.937*** 0.915*** 0.952***
(0.125) (0.125) (0.071) (0.166) (0.162) (0.153)
βy 0.350*** 0.334*** 0.353*** 0.393*** 0.345*** 0.413***






2 0.619 0.626 0.613 0.465 0.501 0.476
Jstat 24 22 27 25 23 30
p-value 0.977 0.997 1 0.913 0.983 0.999
Table 2: Taylor rule without interest-rate smoothing deﬁned as in equation (6):
it = x 
tβ + εt with target variables x 
t =( πt,y t,α −
t−1,ψ α,t−1). */**/*** denotes
signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1 percent level; the standard errors are reported in brackets.
A constant is included in the estimation, but not reported here. Regression method:
GMM estimation.23
period 1987.08–2008.10
with interest-rate without interest-rate
smoothing smoothing
explanatory variables: πt,y t
explanatory variables: πt,y t,α −
t−1
explanatory variables: πt,y t,ψ α,t−1
Figure 2: Testing statistical assumptions for the residuals εt ∼ N(0,σ2
ε) i.i.d. with
the help of quantile vs quantile plots. The qqplots refer to the regressions reported
in the Table 1 and Table 2.24
period 1987.08–2008.10
nobs 255
p11 0.979* (0.552) 0.966* (0.525)
β1,π 1.071*** (0.048) 1.118*** (0.053)
β1,y 0.220*** (0.018) 0.208*** (0.016)
β1,α− -0.027*** (0.004)
β1,ψα -0.902*** (0.127)
i1 5.949 (1.640) 6.574 (3.846)
π1 3.190 (1.165) 3.742 (1.498)
y1 0.651 (3.095) 0.210 (3.607)
α−
1 6.101 (12.935) 5.218 (12.310)
ψα,1 2.657 (0.409) 2.589 (0.413)
p00 0.983 (0.789) 0.980 (0.743)
β0,π 0.204*** (0.056) -0.161* (0.087)
β0,y 0.354*** (0.067) 0.635*** (0.057)
β0,α− -0.021*** (0.005)
β0,ψα -0.284** (0.126)
i0 2.672 (3.509) 3.056 (1.471)
π0 3.025 (0.841) 2.664 (0.943)
y0 -0.687 (1.988) -0.560 (1.645)
α−
0 9.059 (17.745) 9.761 (17.762)




Table 3: Taylor rule deﬁned as in equation (7): it = x 
tβSt +εt with target variables
x 
t =( πt,y t,α −
t−1,ψ α,t−1). The processes can be summarised by: (9). */**/***
denotes signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1 percent level; the standard errors are reported
in brackets. A constant is included in the estimation, but not reported here. Each
state is summarised with the mean, as well as the standard deviation in brackets, of




βπ 0.529*** (0.041) 0.888*** (0.043)
βy 0.107*** (0.016) 0.186*** (0.017)
p11 0.964* (0.495) 0.977* (0.554)
β1,α− -0.027*** (0.004)
β1,ψα -0.323** (0.125)
i1 5.722 (0.790) 6.198 (3.775)
π1 2.883 (0.905) 3.266 (1.223)
y1 0.945 (2.699) 0.949 (3.616)
α−
1 3.636 (10.085) 3.941 (12.990)
ψα,1 2.686 (0.410) 2.659 (0.435)
p00 0.980 (0.624) 0.985 (0.781)
β0,α− -0.075*** (0.009)
β0,ψα -1.402*** (0.131)
i0 3.793 (3.210) 2.690 (1.244)
π0 3.210 (1.168) 2.846 (0.890)
y0 -0.460 (2.875) -0.938 (1.517)
α−
0 10.654 (19.276) 12.144 (19.172)




Table 4: Taylor rule deﬁned as in equation (10): it = X 
tA + x 
tβSt + εt with target
variables x 
t =( πt,y t,α −
t−1,ψ α,t−1). The processes can be summarised as in (12).
*/**/*** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1 percent level; the standard errors are
reported in brackets. A constant is included in the estimation, but not reported
here. Each state is summarised with the mean, as well as the standard deviation in
brackets, of the interest rate and of each target variable. Method: ML estimation
of a Markov switching process.26
Figure 3: Introducing asset price deﬂation as explanatory variable: Federal Funds
rate compared to ˆ ıt = x 
tβ and ˆ ıt = x 
t,nβ with x 
t =( πt,y t), x 
t =( πt,y t,α −
t−1),
x 
t,n =( πt+1,y t+1,α −
t+3)a n dx 




variables πt+1, yt+1, α−
t+3, ψα,t+1 πt+3, yt+3, α−
t+3, ψα,t+1
nobs 255 255
βπ 1.229*** 1.164*** 1.155*** 1.526*** 1.447*** 1.515***
(0.170) (0.161) (0.167) (0.204) (0.199) (0.181)
βy 0.338*** 0.285*** 0.379*** 0.241*** 0.219*** 0.252***






2 0.445 0.479 0.450 0.338 0.332 0.333
Jstat 22 19 26 22 20 25
p-value 0.886 0.947 0.998 0.441 0.595 0.981
Table 5: Forward-looking Taylor rule deﬁned as in equation (14): it =
Etx 
t,nβ + εt with target variables xt,n =( πt+1,y t+1,α −
t+3,ψ α,t+1)a n dxt,n =
(πt+3,y t+3,α −
t+3,ψ α,t+1). */**/*** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1 percent level;
the standard errors are reported in brackets. A constant is included in the estima-
tion, but not reported here. Regression method: GMM estimation.28
period 1987.08–2008.10 1987.08–2008.10
explanatory
variables πt+1, yt+1, α−
t+3, ψα,t+1 πt+3, yt+3, α−
t+3, ψα,t+1
nobs 255 249
p11 0.969* (0.493) 0.978* (0.552) 0.969* (0.509) 0.984 (0.786)
β1,π 1.139*** (0.051) 1.076*** (0.052) 1.185*** (0.070) 1.158*** (0.054)
β1,y 0.261*** (0.017) 0.231*** (0.020) 0.202*** (0.020) 0.187*** (0.020)
β1,α− -0.034*** (0.004) -0.019*** (0.004)
β1,ψα -0.742*** (0.195) -0.454** (0.176)
i1 5.834 (3.307) 6.009 (3.668) 6.075 (3.622) 6.055 (3.752)
π1 3.173 (1.265) 3.212 (1.186) 3.270 (1.270) 3.230 (1.197)
y1 0.029 (3.157) 0.747 (3.435) 0.103 (3.222) 0.699 (3.458)
α−
1 7.201 (14.459) 5.87 (13.916) 6.379 (14.427) 5.946 (14.044)
ψα,1 2.648 (0.409) 2.676 (0.434) 2.624 (0.381) 2.657 (0.430)
p00 0.975 (0.640) 0.984 (0.785) 0.972 (0.793) 0.978* (0.553)
β0,π 0.331*** (0.067) 0.414*** (0.149) 0.380*** (0.086) 0.610*** (0.128)
β0,y 0.635*** (0.053) 0.305*** (0.110) 0.585*** (0.077) 0.279*** (0.067)
β0,α− -0.018*** (0.006) -0.003 (0.007)
β0,ψα -1.042*** (0.158) -0.839*** (0.169)
i0 3.129 (1.597) 2.695 (1.283) 2.881 (1.426) 2.639 (1.242)
π0 3.061 (0.791) 2.928 (0.871) 2.946 (0.864) 2.908 (0.899)
y0 -0.176 (1.925) -0.724 (1.439) -0.459 (1.803) -0.789 (1.470)
α−
0 7.586 (16.914) 10.880 (19.487) 10.224 (18.986) 11.229 (19.502)
ψα,0 2.505 (0.477) 2.529 (0.506) 2.581 (0.513) 2.554 (0.505)
R
2 0.895 0.886 0.896 0.896
logL -273 -286 -277 -280
Table 6: Taylor rule deﬁned as in equation (17): it = x 
t,nβSt +( xt,n − (Ik ⊗
z 
tγ)) δ1,St + δ2,Stω2,t with target variables xt,n =( πt+1,y t+1,α −
t+3,ψ α,t+1)a n d
xt,n =( πt+3,y t+3,α −
t+3,ψ α,t+1). The processes can be summarised as in (9).
*/**/*** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1 percent level; the standard errors are
reported in brackets. A constant is included in the estimation, but not reported
here. Each state is summarised with the mean, as well as the standard deviation in
brackets, of the interest rate and of each target variable. Method: Quasi ML esti-




variables πt+1, yt+1, α−
t+3, ψα,t+1 πt+3, yt+3, α−
t+3, ψα,t+1
nobs 255 255
βπ 1.262*** (0.035) 0.979*** (0.042) 1.179*** (0.037) 1.107*** (0.042)
βy 0.264*** (0.004) 0.215 (0.000) 0.231*** (0.008) 0.176 (0.216)
p11 0.947** (0.431) 0.978* (0.551) 0.960* (0.503) 0.978* (0.552)
β1,α− -0.020*** (0.003) -0.026*** (0.004)
β1,ψα -0.494 (0.000) -0.172 (0.149)
i1 5.665 (2.965) 6.059 (3.680) 5.624 (2.893) 6.063 (3.735)
π1 3.276 (1.189) 3.238 ( 1.198) 3.077 (1.090) 3.239 (1.186)
y1 0.637 (3.796) 0.797 (3.473) 0.654 (3.410) 0.797 (3.487)
α−
1 12.071 (18.554) 5.797 (13.821) 7.189 (15.211) 5.622 (13.994)
ψα,1 2.683 (0.421) 2.683 (0.438) 2.680 (0.521) 2.677 (0.433)
p00 0.960* (0.490) 0.984 (0.783) 0.945* (0.550) 0.984 (0.786)
β0,α− -0.097*** (0.009) -0.077*** (0.014)
β0,ψα -1.535 (0.000) -1.145*** (0.152)
i0 3.690 (1.987) 2.717 (1.295) 3.380 (2.105) 2.647 (1.256)
π0 2.977 (1.027) 2.898 (0.885) 3.192 (0.962) 2.903 (0.893)
y0 -0.495 (1.618) -0.735 (1.445) -0.653 (1.652) -0.795 (1.459)
α−
0 6.202 (15.531) 10.613 (19.246) 5.424 (12.626) 11.211 (19.511)
ψα,0 2.541 (0.456) 2.523 (0.502) 2.406 (0.350) 2.541 (0.503)
R
2 0.668 0.871 0.608 0.886
logL -337 -301 -355 -289
Table 7: Taylor rule deﬁned as in equation (20): it = Xt,nA+x 
t,nβSt +(Ξ t,n −(Ik ⊗
z 
tγ)) δ1,St +δ2,Stω2,t with target variables xt,n =( πt+1,y t+1,α −
t+3,ψ α,t+1) and xt,n =
(πt+3,y t+3,α −
t+3,ψ α,t+1). The processes can be summarised as in (12) . */**/***
denotes signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1 percent level; the standard errors are reported
in brackets. A constant is included in the estimation, but not reported here. Each
state is summarised with the mean, as well as the standard deviation in brackets,
of the interest rate and of each target variable. Method: Quasi ML estimation of a
Markov switching process transformed with a vector of bias correction terms (Kim,
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